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Professor

Jenny Kragl

Professor of Economics, esp. Microeconomics

+49 611 7102 1529 jenny.kragl@ebs.edu
EBS BUSINESS SCHOOL

Research focus

  • Personnel Economics
  • Behavioral Economics
  • Organizational Economics
  • Managerial Economics

Curriculum Vitae

Jenny Kragl is Full Professor of Economics (Microeconomics) at the EBS Business School since 2014. She holds a Doctoral Degree and a Diploma in Business Administration from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Prior to joining the EBS as an Assistant Professor in 2009, she worked at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin as a research associate and member of the Collaborative Research Center “Economic Risk” (SFB 649), funded by the German Research Organization DFG.

At the EBS, she has been acting as the Head of the Economics Section for many years. From January 2018 to July 2023 she has been appointed as the Academic Director of the Bachelor in Business Studies (BSc) Programme. Furthermore she is member of the Research Committee and the Faculty Council of the Business School.

Jenny Kragl’s research contributes to personnel, organizational, and behavioral economics. One core area of her research focuses on other-regarding preferences, relative income concerns, and income inequality. Specifically, she studies the effects thereof in the context of incentive contracts and motivation strategies in managerial and organizational settings as well as in the societal context. Her work has been published in internationally renowned journals (Economics Letters, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics).

At EBS, Jenny Kragl teaches courses in the areas of personnel, managerial, and organizational economics at the undergraduate and graduate levels in the BSc, MSc, MA, and certificate programmes as well as in the executive education.

Publications

  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (in press). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Envy and Wage Transparency on Organizational Design. Economic Theory.
  • KRAGL, J., PALERMO, A., XI, G., BLOCK, J. (2023). Hiring Family or Non-Family Managers when Non-Economic (Sustainability) Goals Matter? A Multitask Agency Model. Small Business Economics, 61, 675–700. doi:10.1007/s11187-022-00706-6.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J. (2021). Inequality and Incentives with Societal Other-Regarding Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 188, 1298-1324. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.024.
  • PALERMO, A., BUCHEN, C., KRAGL, J. (2021). Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking. Economics Letters, 199, 109699. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699.
  • KRAGL, J. (2016). Relational Bonus Contracts vs. Rank-Order Tournaments with Envious Workers. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 172 (3), 417-453. doi:10.1628/093245616X14598620439030.
  • KRAGL, J. (2015). Group versus Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 24 (1), 131-150. doi:10.1111/jems.12088.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2014). Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design. International Economic Review, 55 (2), 525-550. doi:10.1111/iere.12060.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2009). The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2), 766-779. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.016.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2024). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. Jahrestagung 2024 Verein für Socialpolitik, Berlin.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2024). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. EARIE 2024, Amsterdam.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2024). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. 26th Colloquium on Personnel Economics (COPE 2024), University of Zurich.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2024). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. 28th Annual SIOE Conference (SIOE 2024), University of Chicago, USA.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2023). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. IMEBESS 2023 Conference at the Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Lisbon, Portugal.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B. (2023). Standard Wages, Incentive Contracts, and Employment: The Role of Envy Among Unequals. 27th Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE), Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B. (2023). Pay equality and envy among unequals: The impact of equal-fixed- wage constraints on incentive pay and employment of heterogeneous workers. XXII. Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse der Unternehmung 2023 (GEABA), Paderborn/Germany.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2022). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. 24th Colloquium on Personnel Economics (COPE), Aarhus/Denmark.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2022). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. Foundations of Utility and Risky Bi-Annual Conference (FUR), Ghent/Belgium.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2022). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE) Annual Conference, Toronto/Canada.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J., SAFAYNIKOO, P. (2022). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. 21st Copenhagen Network of Experimental Economics (CNEE) Workshop, Copenhagen/Denmark.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B. (2020). Inequality and Incentives with Societal Other-Regarding Preferences. Verein für Socialpolitik Annual Conference, Cologne (virtual meeting).
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B. (2020). Inequality and Incentives with Societal Other-Regarding Preferences. Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE) Annual Conference, Moscow (virtual meeting).
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J. (2019). Inequality and Incentives in Economies with Other-Regarding Preferences. Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE) Annual Conference, Stockholm/Sweden.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J. (2019). Inequality and Incentives in Economies with Other-Regarding Preferences. Colloquium on Personnel Economics (COPE), Augsburg/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2018). Social Preferences and Incentives in Organizations. IDEA Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy, Cargèse/Corsica.
  • KRAGL, J., BENTAL, B. (2018). Output, Welfare, and Incentives in Economies with Other-Regarding Preferences. 19th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA), Frankfurt am Main/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., PALERMO, A., XI, G., BLOCK, J. (2017). Hiring Family or Nonfamily Managers in Family Firms: A Multitask Model with Interdependent Economic and Non-Economic Tasks. 18th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA), Stuttgart/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., XI, G., PALERMO, A., BLOCK, J. (2017). Hiring Family or Nonfamily Managers in Family Firms: a Multitask Model with Interdependence Between Economic and Non-economic Tasks. 21th Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE), New York/USA.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2016). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. 20th Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE), Paris/France.
  • KRAGL, J. (2016). Task Interdependence Between Economic and Non-economic Goals and the Family Owners Decision to Hire a Family or Nonfamily Manager: A Multitask Model. 19th Colloquium on Personnel Economics, Aachen/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2016). Management Incentives in Family Firms: A Multitask Model with Economic and Non-Economic Goals. Final colloquium 2016 of the Collaborative Research Centre 649, Berlin/Germany.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2015). Wage bargaining when workers have fairness concerns. 18th Colloquium on Personnel Economics (COPE), Vienna/Austria.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, Düsseldorf/Germany.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. 14th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA), Madgeburg/Germany.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. Economic Science Association World Meeting, Zurich/Switzerland.
  • KRAGL, J. (2012). Relational Incentive Contracts for Envious Workers. 13th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA), Graz/Austria.
  • KRAGL, J., NIEKEN, P. (2012). The (Dis)Incentive Effect of Relative Pay Comparison: Experimental Evidence. 15th Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie (PÖK), Paderborn/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., NIEKEN, P. (2012). The (Dis)Incentive Effect of Relative Pay Comparison: Experimental Evidence. International Economic Science Association Conference, New York/USA.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Annual Conference of the Royal Economic Society, London/UK.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. 14th Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie (PÖK), Zurich/Switzerland.
  • KRAGL, J. (2010). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 80th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association (SEA), Atlanta/USA.
  • KRAGL, J. (2010). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. 80th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association (SEA), Atlanta/USA.
  • KRAGL, J. (2010). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 37th Annual Meeting of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Istanbul/Turkey.
  • KRAGL, J. (2010). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. the World Meeting of the European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) & Society of Labor Economists (SOLE), London/UK.
  • KRAGL, J. (2010). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. Conference Health. Happiness. Inequality, Darmstadt/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 10th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V., Vallendar/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, Magdeburg/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 24th Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA), Barcelona/Spain.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 13th Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), Berkeley/USA.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. 12th Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie (PÖK), Vienna/Austria.
  • KRAGL, J. (2008). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, Graz/Vienna.
  • KRAGL, J. (2008). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. 9th Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V., Augsburg/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J. (2008). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. 23rd Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA), Milano/Italy.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2007). The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts. Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) Conference: Incentives in Economics, Nuremberg/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2007). Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion. Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, Munich/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2007). Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion. 10th Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie, Tübingen/Germany.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2007). Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion. 22nd Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA), Budapest/Hungary.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2007). Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion. 3rd International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (IMEBE), Malaga/Spain.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHMID, J. (2006). Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion. 2006 Meeting of the European School on New Institutional Economics (ESNIE), Cargèse/Corsica.
  • BENTAL, B., KRAGL, J. (2018). Output, Welfare, and Incentives in Economies with Other-Regarding Preferences.
  • BLOCK, J., KRAGL, J., PALERMO, A., XI, N. (2017). Hiring Family or Nonfamily Managers in Family Firms: A Multitask Model with Interdependent Economic and Non-Economic Goals (17-17). German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA).
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns (No. 13-15). GERMAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION – GEABA.
  • KRAGL, J., NIEKEN, P. (2013). The (Dis) Incentive Effect of Relative Pay Comparison: Experimental Evidence.
  • KRAGL, J. (2012). Relational Incentive Contracts for Envious Workers. German Economic Association of Business Administration e.V. (GEABA).
  • KRAGL, J. (2011). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance.
  • KRAGL, J. (2024). Wage Policies and Incentive Contracts in Organizations: On the Role of Envy. Tagung des Ausschusses Unternehmenstheorie und -politik im Verein für Socialpolitik Tagung, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt.
  • BLOCK, J., KRAGL, J., PALERMO, A., XI, G. (2022). Hiring Family or Non-Family Managers When Non-Economic (Sustainability) Goals Matter? A Multitask Agency Model. Universität Wien.
  • KRAGL, J. (2021). Inequality and Incentives with Societal Other-Regarding Preferences. Zeppelin University.
  • KRAGL, J. (2021). Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design. Universität Wien.
  • KRAGL, J. (2016). Managementanreize in Familienunternehmen bei ökonomischen und nicht-ökonomischen Leistungszielen. Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2014). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. Universität Würzburg.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining When Workers Have Fairness Concerns. KIT, Karlsruhe.
  • GOGOVA, M., KRAGL, J. (2013). Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
  • KRAGL, J. (2012). Relational Incentive Contracts for Envious Workers. Universität Paderborn.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Berlin, Freie Universität.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Universität Heidelberg.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2011). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
  • KRAGL, J., SCHÖTTNER, A. (2010). Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design. Universität Magdeburg.
  • KRAGL, J. (2009). The Impact of Inequity Aversion on Relational Incentive Contracts. Dissertation, published online. Humboldt Universität.
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